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Reinforcements of Minority Nationalist 
Pro-Europeanism
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Abstract
In the 1980’s minority nationalist parties adopted a policy of “independence in Eu-
rope.” Paradoxically, the policy simultaneously advocated conceding powers to a supra-
national body and taking back powers from the state. EU regional development programs 
initially spurred these pro-European policies, but these programs have since failed. Given 
the EU incentives, why do minority nationalist parties remain pro-European? I test a bot-
tom-up, party political theory and use the British case studies of the Scottish National Party 
and the Welsh nationalist party, Plaid Cymru. I argue that these parties have remained pro-
European because they are small oppositional parties. As small oppositional parties, minority 
nationalist parties have unique strategic mechanisms that incentivize policy inertia. These 
mechanisms are: (1) the continuity and dominance of party leadership in making EU policy, 
(2) underdeveloped policy positions, and (3) the importance of transnational coalitions. Im-
plications include the possibility that as minority nationalist parties grow in size and power, 
they might alter their European position to suit changing strategic considerations. 
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Introduction
“Scotland’s Future—Independence in Europe” dominates the front page of a 1990 
Scottish National Party pamphlet. After decades of anti-European rhetoric, the Scottish Na-
tional Party voted at a party conference in 1983 to support the European Community and 
the new slogan placed the pro-European policy at the center of SNP ideology. Today, the 
SNP’s pro-European position remains unchanged. Deputy leader Nicola Sturgeon pledged 
Scotland would be a “proud and constructive partner in the European family” upon inde-
pendence (Johnson, 2013). Since the 1980’s, sustained pro-Europeanism has been a pattern 
in minority nationalist1 parties across Europe. 
At the time that pro-European policies developed, the Europe of the Regions model 
created a hospitable environment for minority nationalists by valuing the input of sub-state 
regions and local authorities. Minority nationalist parties enjoyed the “pincer effect” as they 
squeezed state power locally and at the EU level (Lynch, 1996, p. 14). The 1980’s were 
also relatively hospitable for the European Union among mainstream parties. However, 
domestic and EU contexts have changed dramatically. Both mainstream Europhilia and the 
Europe of the Regions have faded over the past 30 years. Most positions in the Council of 
Ministers and European Commission are still dominated by parties in government and ex-
clude regional powers (Elias, 2008). A “growing discrepancy between ‘regional’ priorities” 
hindered regional lobbying at the European Union (Rowe, 2011, p. 8). In conjunction with 
lack of regional unity, “national governments proved themselves to be highly adept at acting 
as ‘gatekeepers’” (Elias, 2008, p. 486).2 Domestically, “increased Euroscepticism has been 
the corollary of increased integration” (Taggart, 1998, p. 363). 
Given the failure of the Europe of the Regions and increased Euroscepticism, why 
have minority nationalist parties remained pro-European? Minority nationalist parties have 
remained pro-European because they are small and oppositional. The characteristics of small 
and oppositional parties that incentivize them to remain pro-European are: (1) the domi-
nance and continuity of party leadership on EU policy, (2) the underdeveloped nature of 
EU policy, and (3) the importance of transnational coalitions. Before elaborating upon these 
mechanisms, I will explain this paper’s structure.
My second section briefly explains and evaluates an existing top-down theory of the 
relationship between Europe and minority nationalist parties. The previous literature is split 
into two approaches: the top-down approach and the bottom-up approach. The first model 
focuses on how the EU fostered support in regions through the Europe of the Regions 
model and relies on the Europeanization concept of party-EU relations. In the third sec-
tion, I review the bottom up literature and describe my own party political methodology. 
To explain this methodology, I define “minority nationalist” and “small and oppositional.” 
In section four, I present the argument for my specific theory that small and oppo-
sitional strategies of minority nationalist parties allow them to remain pro-European. This 
argument has three subsections echoing the mechanisms of small and oppositional strategy: 
dominance of leaders in EU policy, underdeveloped policies, and transnational coalitions. 
In the concluding section, I note the limitations of my argument, namely my restricted case 
1	 	Minority	nationalism	is	“the	denial	of	exclusive	claims	on	the	part	of	the	state	nationalism	and	the	assertion	
of	national	rights	of	self-determination	for	groups	within	it”	(Keating	2001,	18).	More	definitions	are	included	
on page 6.
2	 	For	more	on	the	failure	of	the	Europe	of	the	Regions,	see	Loughlin	(1996)	and	Hepburn	(2008).
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study and definitional difficulties. These limitations reveal important implications as some 
minority nationalist parties grow. Before looking forward, I look back at the existing litera-
ture on minority nationalists and the EU. 
The Top Down Approach: Examining and Evaluating Previous Theories 
The top-down group of literature, led by the early work of Michael Keating, pinpoints 
the Europe of the Regions concept as a major motivation for minority nationalist par-
ties. This model allowed them to bypass their traditional enemy, the state (Keating, 1995). 
When faced with the development of a European Union, minority nationalists responded 
to it with their most dominant and well developed interest—the “autonomy goal” (Hoppe, 
2007). Politically, the autonomy goal was furthered by the EU taking away power from 
the state. Economically, the Common Market nurtured stronger regional economies (Kar-
olewski, 2007; Keating, 1995). 
This top-down approach is framed by the process of Europeanization. Europeaniza-
tion is a process in which European integration influences domestic political parties, elec-
toral systems and policy. European integration is the independent variable, while political 
parties are dependent (Kulahci, 2012, p. 1). In this sense, the centrally European led initia-
tives of the Europe of the Regions—including the Committee of the Regions—can be 
seen as methods by which the European Union incorporates and influences political parties. 
Especially in relation to smaller parties, the EU is seen as the major actor and the initiator of 
contact. Europeanization is the first model that we can identify to explain our question and 
it suggests that minority nationalists became pro-European in response to EU-led incentives. 
Although Europeanization may explain the initial shift towards pro-Europeanism, it is 
less applicable to current minority nationalist parties because European top-down influence 
on minority nationalist parties has been minimal. It has been more minimal than mainstream 
parties because minority nationalists are not ruling parties and the regional outreach of the 
1990’s has died down. The party political literature begins to provide another explanation. 
In contrast to the Europeanization model, my argument suggests that minority nationalist 
party pro-Europeanism is underpinned by their own strategic behaviors, not those of the 
EU. 
A Party Political Approach: Previous Literature, Terminology and Methodology 
The party political literature focuses on the internal structure of minority nationalist 
parties and their strategic behavior using the EU as a tool. It challenges the idea that nation-
alism alone causes pro-Europeanism. In the Welsh Plaid Cymru and the Galician Bloque 
Nacionalista Galego (BNG), “strategic and tactical considerations exerted a growing pres-
sure on what position was formally espoused vis-a-vis the EU” (Elias, 2008, p. 577). Elias 
suggested an internal angle was necessary in understanding EU positions. Carolyn Rowe’s 
book (2011) focuses on representations in Europe and shows that regional goals go beyond 
nationalism. Janet Laible’s book (2008) complements Rowe’s research by showing that 
minority nationalist Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) use the European Parlia-
ment to criticize the norm, gain valuable resources, and engage on issues that are domesti-
cally important. 
Although party political authors begin to argue that parties act strategically, they do not 
suggest what specific strategy might influence them. They focus on many diverse EU strate-
gies but don’t identify an overarching strategic characteristic. These authors have also been 
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limited by the need to prove that the top-down approach is not appropriate. This leaves less 
room for alternative explanations. 
In order to present a clear strategic argument, I must first clarify the definition of 
minority nationalism. Then I substantiate the two foundational arguments: minority na-
tionalists are pro-European and minority nationalists are small and oppositional. These foun-
dational arguments will build up to my argument: minority nationalists have remained pro-
European because they are small and oppositional. 
Definition of Minority Nationalist 
Minority nationalism is “the denial of exclusive claims on the part of the state national-
ism and the assertion of national rights of self-determination for groups within it” (Keating, 
1996, p. 18). Minority nationalist groups seek autonomy outside of state structures. Minor-
ity nationalism has been substituted with the term “regionalism.” I do not use regionalism 
because it is not significantly different from “minority nationalism,” yet it is unpopular 
within the parties. Regionalism promotes the territorial, cultural, and political identities of 
a region but does not strive for a separate state (Karolewski, 2007, p. 32). The only differ-
ence with minority nationalism is that nationalists seek independence. However, minority 
nationalist parties oscillate between separatism and more autonomy depending on domestic 
strategy. Plaid Cymru leader Leanne Wood said, “Plaid Cymru wants an independent Wales 
within the European Union …but in order to get there, there are a number of posts along 
the way” so the party does not formally call for an independence referendum (Torrance, 
2012). PC exemplifies how regionalists are minority nationalists who may have more posts 
to go along the way. Additionally, “nationalist” is what parties tend to call themselves.
Definition of Small and Oppositional
Minority nationalist parties are small and oppositional in relation to the state because 
the state has ultimate authority over EU relations. Minority nationalists are oppositional 
because they run only in their specific region of a state. They could only come into gov-
ernment as a minority party in a coalition but even this rarely occurs as their representation 
tends to be so miniscule in relation to the state. As a result of regional limitations, member-
ship also remains small compared to state parties. For example, the SNP has the most mem-
bers in Scotland (approximately 25,000), but this is small compared to the 134,000 member 
Conservative Party (Gardham, 2013; Dominiczak, 2013). Given these limitations, minority 
nationalists can always be seen as “small” and “oppositional” in the EU context. By pinning 
down the definitions of minority nationalism and by characterizing the parties further, I 
can focus on how small and oppositional characteristics foster and protect pro-Europeanism. 
Case Study Selection 
My research will focus on one country, the United Kingdom. This reduces the risk 
of country specific intervening variables that can complicate analyses (Kulahci, 2012, p. 
7). The UK is a useful case study because it has multiple developed parties and devolution 
which allows regional data and news to be disaggregated. My UK case study focuses on two 
parties: the Scottish National Party (SNP) and Plaid Cymru (PC). Both the SNP and PC 
became pro-European in the 1980’s and have held that position for the last 30 years. Instead 
of a multi-country study, I compile intraparty, domestic, and European strategies and argue 
that these might be united under one single strategic concern. The SNP and PC are diverse 
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choices. The SNP has a majority in the Scottish Parliament and is soon voting on inde-
pendence. PC is the third largest party in the National Assembly for Wales with regionalist 
goals. Despite differences, both utilize small and oppositional strategies. 
I exclude Northern Irish nationalists because their nationalism is not minority nation-
alism. Irish nationalists want to rejoin Ireland, not become independent, and Irish nation-
alism is tied to sectarianism. Despite this exception, the pattern is not isolated. Strategic 
considerations can be generalized across small oppositional parties. The case studies illustrate 
these general truths.
Minority Nationalist Party Strategy towards Europe as Small and Oppositional 
Given the failure of the Europe of the Regions and the Euroscepticism of the British 
political system, why have minority nationalist parties in the UK remained pro-European? 
Minority nationalist parties have remained pro-European because of their unique strategic 
concerns as small and oppositional parties. Small and oppositional strategic mechanisms that 
allow them to remain pro-European are: (1) the dominance and continuity of party leader-
ship on EU policy, (2) the underdeveloped nature of EU policy, and (3) the importance 
of transnational coalitions. By connecting these concepts and focusing on the mechanisms 
that drive the connection, I highlight how size and positioning foster pro-European policy 
inertia. In the following three subsections, I analyze each mechanism in turn. 
The Continuity and Dominance of Party Leadership on European Union Policy 
Small parties have more policy continuity between leaders and police internal dissent 
more strongly than mainstream parties which protects pro-European policies despite con-
textual changes. 
Policy continuity between leaders 
Leadership in small parties tends to be more united and less contested. Much of the 
EU policy continuity within minority nationalist parties is determined by agreement and 
stability between party leaders. I trace the leadership continuity in two ways: by tracing 
rhetorical continuity between leaders and by comparing leadership elections between small 
and large parties. 
The SNP’s pro-European rhetoric has been passed down from leader to leader since 
Gordon Wilson pioneered it in the 1980’s. During the 1983 conference, “the SNP leader, 
Gordon Wilson, proposed a more positive approach towards the EC…Wilson started to 
advance the idea that European membership would have helped Scotland to withdraw from 
the British Union without suffering any kind of economic disadvantage” (Tarditi, 2010, 
p. 14). Wilson also argued that, “an independent Scotland could reap the same substantial 
economic benefits enjoyed by other small sovereign Community members, such as Den-
mark…[he talked] enthusiastically of opening Scottish trade offices in all European capitals” 
(Bradley, 1988). A decade later, the SNP’s frame of the EU’s benefits remained economic. 
The 1997 SNP manifesto focused on the economic security the EU provides for pensions, 
agriculture, and fisheries (SNP 1997 Manifesto, p. 14, 23, 25, 26). The 2011 manifesto 
promises to make Scotland “Europe’s green energy powerhouse” and to use EU funds to 
improve employability and education training (SNP 2011 Manifesto, p. 10, 12, 34, 36). 
Current party leaders echo Wilson’s calls of a Nordic relationship to the European Union. 
Member of the European Parliament Alyn Smith said to a Welsh audience, “Our people, 
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in Scotland and Wales, have already started down a different path. In our Parliament and 
your Senedd, proportional, coalition, minority governments! How European, how Nordic 
specifically. We have a different set of values…Those values fit into a social democratic 
Nordic Europe” (Smith, 2007). 
Alex Salmond’s SNP led Scottish Government focuses on driving foreign investment 
and his ministers lead trade missions throughout Europe, just as Wilson envisioned. The 
SNP led government established institutions like Scotland’s Exchange, which promotes 
networking between Scots abroad, and expanded the Scottish Development International 
offices (SNP Manifesto 2011, p. 29). “The Scottish Government’s key international priority 
for 2013 and 2014 is to increase the level of engagement with the European Union and its 
member countries” and the 2014-2015 Draft Budget notes economic priorities are Euro-
pean events, EU wide renewable energy and creative industry partnerships across Europe 
(Scottish Government, 2013, p. 39; 108) focus on proactive economic engagement was 
initiated by the SNP’s Government and echoes Wilsons hope of increased trade across Eu-
rope. The 2003 Labour-led budget focused on obtaining funds not on proactive economic 
engagement (Scottish Government, April 2002). Thus, Gordon Wilson’s strategic view of 
the European Union as a platform for economic engagement remains a central SNP strategy 
for Europe today. 
Europeanism is a policy that has been passed down through Welsh nationalism since 
the 1920’s. PC founding father Saunders Lewis’s “Europeanist ideas would shape Plaid 
Cymru’s constitutional thinking for generations to come. An alternative agenda of co-
operative small nation politics within a broader international context would become deeply 
ingrained in Plaid Cymru’s political mindset” (Elias, 2013, p. 48). At a speech to the 2014 
spring party conference, Plaid Cymru MEP Jill Evans said, “We gain from Europe, but we 
contribute to her as well. We are a modern, bilingual European nation. We can teach other 
countries as well as learn from them. What we need to build is an equal partnership” (Ev-
ans, 2014). Evans expressed the distinct Welsh angle of pro-Europeanism that portrays the 
relationship between Wales and Europe as a “cooperative” space and a “partnership. ” This 
understanding of Wales’s relationship to the EU has passed from leader to leader. 
Pro-European policy continuity between leaders is more likely in small parties because 
their leadership elections have been less contested and less controversial. Scottish National 
Party leadership elections have been won overwhelmingly since pro-Europeanism emerged 
in 1990. Alex Salmond won the 1990 election 486 to 186. Even though there was “a 
known preference of his parliamentary colleagues and Gordon Wilson” for his opponent, 
the overwhelming vote made him a clear successor (Chittenden, 1990). Salmond’s eventual 
successor, John Swinney, followed his gradualist approach and is now a key figure in Sal-
mond’s Scottish Government. Swinney comfortably won the leadership post 547 to 268 in 
2000 and 577 to 111 in 2004 despite what was seen as a divisive and potentially devastating 
internal battle between “gradualists” and “fundamentalists” (Quinn, 2012, Appendix G). 
Finally, Alex Salmond won the 2007 leadership election with 76 % of the vote and has led 
unopposed since (Quinn, 2012, Table G.1). In Plaid Cymru, Ieuan Wyn Jones won the 
leadership by 50.7 per cent of the vote in 2003 and remained leader for 9 years until he 
stood down (Quinn, 2012, Appendix H). In a two round election in 2012, Leanne Wood 
became Plaid Cymru leader with 57 % of the vote (Morris, 2012). 
In contrast, larger parties’ leadership elections had more contenders and were less de-
cisive. The Labour Party’s 2010 election had five candidates and the election needed four 
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stages before a leader was decided. In the fourth stage, Ed Miliband won with only 50.65 % 
of the vote. His win was much more tenuous considering he trailed David Miliband for the 
first three rounds (Kelly, Lester, & Durkin, 2010, p. 15). Early on, David Cameron faced 
strong competition from Liam Fox and David Davis. Ultimately, Cameron lost the vote 
among Conservative Members of Parliament. Among MPs, he won 28.3 %, Davis won 31.3 
% and Fox won 21.2 %. In addition to having weak elite support, he only received 45.5 % 
of the members’ votes. Before the party’s conference, Cameron had only 17 % support from 
party members. During the election, he had to match his policies to better suit their needs 
and this radicalized his European policy (Quinn, 2012, p. 113). 
Cameron’s situation shows how leadership elections drive leaders’ policy positions to 
be more distinct from their predecessors and more radical. Cameron had to “firm up his 
Eurosceptic credentials during the campaign” (Quinn, 2012, p. 118; Temko, 2005). The 
Daily Telegraph noted that “Cameron woos the right with an attack on Europe” and one 
Tory MP pressured him to be more clear with his policy, stating, “he can’t carry on being 
all things to all men forever” (Trefgame, Jones, & Sparrow, 2005; Brady & Barnes, 2005). 
The SNP elite actively avoided this situation. When Alex Salmond chose to run in 2007, his 
biggest competition, Nicola Sturgeon, stepped down. Current Justice Secretary Kenny Ma-
cAskill also stepped down to allow Sturgeon to run for Deputy First Minister on Salmond’s 
ticket. The lack of strong opposition and the ability to compromise behind closed doors 
allows small party leaders to face less policy criticism and thus, are not pressured to change 
the policy positions of their predecessors. 
Strong consequences for dissent 
Minority nationalist parties are more likely to crack down upon internal dissent be-
cause as a small party they are less able to withstand internal fissures. Since the 1980’s, 
potentially divisive conversations have been suppressed so the EU remains exclusively an 
elite policy area. These biases against internal conflict allow party leaders to make EU policy 
unilaterally and strengthen pro-European policy continuity. 
Recent conflicts within the Scottish National Party splintered the party and taught 
membership and leadership that conflict is best avoided. The best example of this is the 
1982 expulsion of the socialist SNP organization the 1979 Group, which included many 
current leaders. Recently, Gordon Wilson said the traumatic expulsion of the 79 Group was 
necessary for the unity of the party and “history has proved him to be correct. Perhaps it’s 
the memory of that bitter time that ensures that the modern SNP are so disciplined” (The 
Herald, February 2014). In fact, by the late 1980’s the SNP had unified again. By then the 
party was finally “dedicating itself to achievement of a significant breakthrough and not al-
lowing emergence of self-imposed obstacles” (Wilson, 1989). More recently, comparing the 
North Atlantic Trade Organization (NATO) debate in the SNP to recent backbench revolts 
on Europe in the Conservative Party exemplifies how much stronger aversion to internal 
dissent is within smaller parties. 
Policy change on NATO was brought in from above, introduced and championed by 
MP Angus Robertson. Robertson’s policy change led to a close vote at the party’s 2012 au-
tumn conference with the leadership ultimately prevailing as the motion passed 426 to 332 
(BBC News 2012). The strong reaction by media and those within the party shows how 
important internal coherence is to the SNP. The NATO debate was framed as “an internal 
rebellion” by the media (Daily Record, October, 2012; Johnson, 2012). To combat this 
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rhetoric, SNP leaders were quick to assure each other and voters that unity was premium. 
In his opening words of the conference Alex Salmond reminded the party, “I trust this con-
ference to operate in the best interests of achieving independence for Scotland. I trust this 
conference to debate the big issues in a comradely manner” (Salmond, 2012). Leaders also 
activated personal influence in their membership by calling on the support of well-respected 
former leaders like Winnie Ewing and by using party resources to distribute pamphlets 
throughout the party (Robertson, 2012). 
The most serious result of the debate was the disaffiliation of Members of Scottish 
Parliament (MSPs) Jean Urquhart and John Finnie from the party. Their defection was 
portrayed the “near disappearance of [Alex Salmond’s] majority in the parliament - he now 
has 65 of the 129 MSPs” (Swanson, 2012). However, most of the dozen MSPs who had 
been against changing NATO policy fell into line with the decision. In fact, within the 
party, the mood after the debate ultimately felt self-congratulatory. Salmond echoed this 
feeling by commenting: “We had an excellent and democratic debate at party conference 
last Friday, and agreed a policy of reaffirming our opposition to nuclear weapons as a non-
nuclear member of the NATO alliance - a position that will be accepted by the party as a 
whole” (BBC News, October 2012). The result reaffirmed that on policy, “Salmond has 
been trusted with a long leash” by his party’s own membership (Massie, 2012). 
A general lack of interest in the EU reduces the impetus to overcome policy inertia 
and elite leadership. British public opinion on the EU can be generalized as “widespread 
indifference or uncertainty” (Usherwood, 2002, p. 216-219). The persistent lack of interest 
means that there is no strong grassroots impetus to internal conflict. To some extent, elite 
leadership within minority nationalist parties follows society wide elite leadership on Europe 
but elite leaders in small parties are more consistent (Hellstrom, 2008). Stewart Maxwell 
MSP confirmed that, “because there is a settled position, it’s the senior party members who 
deal with the EU. In terms of what the party does, it’s a few senior members of the party 
who drive the changes” (S. Maxwell, personal communication, January 8, 2014). EU policy 
has remained the same in minority nationalist parties because of the closer connections be-
tween these senior members and because unity is viewed as indispensable. 
Underdeveloped and Broad Policy 
Small and oppositional party policies are more likely to be underdeveloped, especially 
on foreign affairs. Broad EU policy encourages minority nationalist parties to maintain pro-
European policy through two mechanisms: their reliance on Euro-enthusiasts for detailed 
decisions and the oppositional usefulness of broad pro-European rhetoric. 
Lack of resources 
A lack of resources reduces funding for small parties’ European policy and campaign-
ing. Capital in smaller parties will almost always be more difficult to come by as a result 
of fewer membership fees and less reputational pull with big sources of funding. I measure 
spending on European policy through European Parliament campaign spending. Campaign 
spending provides a useful measurement because spending during that time indicates the 
amount of importance parties put on the European Union as a policy arena. Not only do 
small parties have less money, they spend a smaller proportion of money on European issues 
when compared to regional elections. This can be seen in Table 1 in the appendix. It is not 
strategically valuable for a small, oppositional party to fight with the same intensity in each 
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race. A Plaid Cymru party member explains: “Plaid Cymru is never going to be in power 
in Westminster…we’re the main opposition party in the Assembly and only Assembly elec-
tions will bring us self-determination” (Elias, 2013, p. 73). 
This relative lack of spending on Europe affects policy through lack of spending on 
manifestos in small parties. According to the Electoral Commission party spending reports, 
in the 2009 European Parliament election, the SNP spent 1762 pounds, PC spent 840 
pounds and the Scottish Green Party spent 120 pounds on manifestos. The Conservative 
Party spent 870 pounds in Scotland and 1773 pounds in Wales, but overall the party spent 
11, 197 pounds. The benefits from huge resources overall to develop policy at a national 
level that can then be used in devolved regions. Thus, the SNP’s spending on EP manifestos 
is on par with mainstream parties but when taking into account the mainstream spending 
across the UK, they are massively over powered by larger parties. Small party policy de-
velopment is also constrained because they lack access to the European Commission and 
bureaucracy. Most EU institutions remain state-led. This may reduce small party knowledge 
of EU issues even if they might attempt to engage. While UK ministers are obliged to be 
present when devolved leaders communicate with the EU they are not obliged to inform 
Scottish or Welsh leaders of their communications. 
How does a lack of monetary and informational resources maintain pro-European 
policy? Fewer resources to spend on manifesto writing and policy development mean that 
expert staff on Europe are a small group of people (MEPs and their staff) within the party 
who will tend to have some affiliation or innate interest in Europe. Additionally, there are 
fewer MEPs—Plaid Cymru has one (Jill Evans) and the Scottish National Party has two 
(Alyn Smith, Ian Hudghton) compared to the 26 of the Conservative Party. As a result of 
the small number of MEPs and the lack of resources spent on European policy, small parties 
rely on more narrow feedback from the European Parliament. Alyn Smith MEP explained, 
“We will to some extent take our line from the Scottish Government and where there isn’t 
a line we help to create a line.” (A. Smith, personal communication, January 10, 2014). 
Smith’s liaison to the Scottish Parliament Paul Togneri added, “Our MEPs have a larger 
role in ensuring that the party knows what’s happening in Europe and that the party hier-
archy knows what’s going on” (P. Togneri, personal communication, January 15, 2014). 
MEPs in larger parties are much less likely to have this type of bottom up policy making 
influence because this would be too difficult to coordinate. Additionally, “when a party is 
in government, it could be damaging if its MEPs voted against what the government had 
agreed upon in the Council of Ministers or in the European Council” (Raunio, 2000, p. 
218). Raunio’s empirical analysis and surveys of parties’ attitudes towards MEPs proves that 
“regarding party size, the effect is as expected, with MEPs being more influential in smaller 
parties” (Raunio, 2000, p. 220). 
The influence of MEPs drives policy to become more pro-European because, “one 
of the consequences of the varying expertise in the European area within or among the 
political parties, especially those whose Euro-enthusiasm is cool, is that those individuals in 
the parties who do have specialist knowledge…will gain influence in the party in this area 
because of their rare knowledge and will invariably be Euro enthusiasts” (Gaffney, 1996). 
As a result of their reliance on MEPs and European Parliament (EP) staff as informational 
and policy making figures, small parties European policies will be biased towards Euro-
enthusiasm. 
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Broad policy as an oppositional tool 
Another reason that small party leaders detail only limited aspects of European Union 
policy is that it is strategically useful. Small parties are oppositional and thus by remaining 
broadly pro-European in a Eurosceptic party system they’re able to criticize most of the 
mainstream party positions on Europe. A review of minority nationalist press releases shows 
the oppositional nature of their EU policies. 
The parties use the EU to criticize the UK government and governing parties for 
shunning the EU and also for incorporating EU policies. The SNP criticizes “internationally 
isolated Westminster, as Labour and the Tories both move towards an in/out referendum” 
and claims this isolationism is bad for business (Scottish National Party, January 2013; Scot-
tish National Party, November 2013). On the other hand they oppose the government’s 
integration of EU policy on various issues including fisheries, agriculture and animal wel-
fare. When mainstream parties do incorporate EU policy, the SNP suggests that they do 
not stand up for Scotland. One such claim is that “successive Labour and Tory government 
failure to stand up for our fishing industry in Europe has been a disgrace” (Scottish National 
Party, April 2009). MEP Ian Hudghton attacked the “London-led Labour and Lib Dems 
support [for] an attempted ban on trawling in the Atlantic, a move which would have had 
a devastating effect on the Scottish industry” (Greens-EFA, October 2013). Plaid Cymru 
portrays their own EU policy as “putting Wales first” and accuse mainstream parties of for-
getting Wales. MEP Jill Evans suggests that “time after time we’ve seen the Labour Welsh 
government and the Tory UK government failing Wales, over transport routes and, most 
recently, over flooding” (Plaid Cymru, March 2014). Mainstream party Euroscepticism is 
portrayed as “petty point-scoring” and “posturing by London based political parties” (Plaid 
Cymru, May 2013). They portray Euroscepticism not as rejection of the EU but rather as 
a more basic dichotomy, claiming that “the advantages of EU membership far outweigh 
the alternative – isolationism.” Thus PC far outweighs the alternative choice—mainstream 
Eurosceptics (Evans speech, October 2013). 
The SNP and PC take advantage of the fact that they cannot negotiate with the Eu-
ropean Union by using opposition on the EU to bring up wider issues against mainstream 
parties. This behavior by oppositional parties is in line with the idea that, “the pivotal actor 
in electoral contests is not necessarily always the median voter…it may be optimal for ex-
ecutives in some institutional and strategic settings to target a narrow group of voters (e.g., 
voters in swing districts or partisan voters), whereas other contexts may encourage gov-
ernments to represent broader electoral interests” (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008, p. 312). 
Since public attention to the details of EU policy is low, oppositional parties do not neces-
sarily need to follow public opinion. Rather, they co-opt the issue of the EU to “represent 
broader electoral interests,” namely anti-government stances. Broad pro-European policies 
benefit small parties by providing a rhetorical way to express anti-mainstream policies and 
they also allow day to day policy decisions to be made by natural Euro enthusiasts—those 
already in Brussels.
 
The Importance and Benefits of Transnational Coalitions 
Small, oppositional parties rely on transnational relationships at the EU level for mon-
etary and reputational capital. Notably, these connections are generated horizontally—be-
tween parties—and not vertically like funding benefits of the Europe of the Regions. 
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Resources gains at the European Union 
Small parties gain funding for staff and policy development through the European Par-
liament. Each Member of Parliament has a staff and services budget of €21, 209 per month 
which can be used to employ assistants in Brussels and in their constituency. Small parties 
tend to make these staff budgets go further and share these budgets with national parlia-
mentarians so staffing budget benefits the party’s domestic popularity. For example, SNP 
MEP Ian Hudghton employs 7 assistants, in full and in part. By partly employing assistants, 
Hudghton and fellow SNP MEP Alyn Smith share staff part time with MSPs who pay for 
them part time as well. In this way and also through sharing office costs, European Parlia-
ment budgets benefit the SNP domestically too. In general, small party MEPs employ more 
staff than mainstream parties. Plaid Cymru MEP Jill Evans employs six assistants, United 
Kingdom Independence Party leader Nigel Farage employs five assistants and Green MEP 
Jean Lambert employs 12. An average Conservative MEP has 4 assistants.3 Just as they focus 
their campaigning budgets on regional elections, minority nationalist MEPs spread their 
staffing budgets to add value at their main arena of focus—regional parliaments. 
More benefits are accessed through party coalitions. Minority nationalist and Green 
parties have coalesced into the Greens-European Free Alliance (EFA) Party Group. Euro-
pean Parliament party groups receive their own funding separate from MEPs allowances. 
Mainly “the material benefits of being in a group include more office space and staff, and 
more money for organising meetings and distributing information” (Miller, 2009, p. 5). The 
SNP use the Greens-EFA Group to employ an SNP expert on fisheries policy who serves 
the whole group but provides European policy support to the SNP in particular. They 
gain more resources for their domestic priority—fisheries—but party groups also provide 
broader informational resources to process EU developments which can be difficult with 
few resources. Through the Greens-EFA Group, SNP MEPs gain the policy expertise of 
other parties across Europe. The Scottish MEPs “work very closely with the Greens. They 
have advisors who are looking at detailed consequences of the complete legislative package 
and then our advisors will look over what the Green group advisors nail it down to and we 
will look at the effects for Scotland separately. Then we see if we should vote along with the 
group depending on how it affects Scotland” (Togneri interview, 2014).
This information sharing within party coalitions also allows small party MEPs to better 
inform leaders, which is a main responsibility and source of leaders strategic information. 
The European Free Alliance defines itself as “a pro-European party that endorses the Euro-
pean Union’s values” and the Green Party also sees the EU as instrumental in environmental 
protection (EFA website, “About Us”; Greens-EFA website, “History”). Small party MEPs’ 
lack of resources necessitates reliance on their party groups for help processing information. 
This information is passed on to leaders who rely on their MEPs for European expertise. 
Through this informational chain, the pro-Europeanism of the Greens-EFA group main-
tains minority nationalist pro-Europeanism. Even without the Euro enthusiast informational 
bias, the aid in processing EU developments encourages minority nationalists to maintain 
strong European connections. 
3  All assistant numbers based on the European Parliament’s register, available at http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/meps/en/assistants.html.
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Reputational gains at the European Union 
Even more than resources, reputation is an important strategic concern for small par-
ties who struggle to legitimate themselves in the domestic media. BBC archives “suggest 
that online news coverage is distorted in favor of the three largest parties, particularly Con-
servative and Labour. With the exceptions of the Greens and Respect, Labour and the 
Conservatives generally have about 10 times as many mentions in news stories as the other 
parties” (Ward, 2008, p. 142). Although the SNP was mentioned with the same frequency 
as the Liberal Democrats on BBC news, they still trailed by over 100 articles to the Con-
servatives and Labour. Plaid Cymru fared even worse, having only 40 news articles to their 
main regional competitor Labour’s 347 articles (Ward, 2008, Table 7.1, p. 143). Small par-
ties struggle to challenge this lack of media coverage domestically because they are seen as 
perpetually oppositional. The SNP attempted to do so by mounting a legal challenge against 
the BBC for excluding Alex Salmond from leadership debates. However, “critics pointed 
out the SNP was not a UK party – it now has only six out of 650 Westminster seats – and it 
had no hope of becoming the government. Salmond was also standing down as an MP and 
had no prospect of becoming prime minister” (Carrell, 2010). Thus minority nationalists 
struggle to gain media attention domestically due to their regional limitations. 
Europe can provide a solution to this lack of coverage and legitimacy. The European 
Parliament has a much better reputation than Europe as a whole. In fact, 52 % of Europeans 
feel that the Parliament should have a larger role and only 22 % feel it should have a reduced 
role (Parlemeter, February 2011). By linking party leadership with the European Parlia-
ment, small parties signal to the public that they are competent. Only 25 per cent of people 
trust their national parliament, while 31 % trust the European Parliament (Eurobarometer, 
December 2013). 
One way small parties capitalize on the trust in the European Parliament is to nominate 
party leadership to become MEPs. As MEPs, they can represent the party with the legiti-
macy of the European Union. SNP MEPs Winnie Ewing and Ian Hudghton both served 
as party presidents, and MEP Allan MacCartney was deputy leader of the party. Alyn Smith 
said, “We [the SNP] have the European angle front and center” including a permanent 
MEP position on the party’s decision making body, the National Executive Committee 
(Smith interview, January 2014). Plaid Cymru MEP Jill Evans served as President until 
2013. Many parties have an EU representative on the executive committee but “in larger 
parties, usually only the leaders of the EP delegation are members of the executive organs” 
(Raunio, 2000, p. 213). In small parties, the EU representatives are at the highest and most 
central levels of party decision making. 
Small party MEPs use EU power to draw attention to the most important domestic 
issues but they need their transnational connections to do so. Transnational party politi-
cal groups also provide procedural advantages like appointments to committees, allocating 
speaking time, and helping EU agenda setting (Miller, 2009, p. 6). Committee assignments 
are more important for small parties because they usually have a very limited EU policy 
focus that is specific to local lobbies and thus their specific policy interests might be very 
narrow. For example the SNP’s Ian Hudghton is on the fisheries committee, which is a 
major issue in Scotland. Jill Evans is on the Environmental Committee which allows her to 
speak authoritatively on renewable energy, which Party leader Leanne Wood promoted as 
the party’s mechanism for growing the Welsh economy (Wood, 2012). Having some real 
influence on the most pressing issues in their constituency allows MEPs to back up their 
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rhetoric that they “fought for” their constituency despite only having one or two MEPs in 
their party. Minority nationalists would be unable to do this through the state so it’s very 
important that they gain positions at the EP to suit their domestic needs. Transnational 
coalitions ensure this. 
Smaller parties also use their EU relationships to draw positive attention. This was vis-
ible at the Scottish March for Independence in 2013, where “50 to 60 Flemish nationalist 
campaigners from the Vlaamse Volksbeweging (VVB) coalition were distributing leaflets 
to promote that march and a pan-European initiative to get one million signatures on a 
petition for self-determination sent in to the European Commission” (Carrell, 2013). Scot-
tish success provided a rallying point and opportunity for Flemish nationalists to promote 
themselves and to seek validation. PC MEP Jill Evans also relied on other minority nation-
alist parties in speeches to legitimize Plaid Cymru’s plans. She noted transnational policy 
inspirations from economic plans in the Basque Country, the Peace Institute models of the 
Flemish, and the peaceful civic nationalist movement of the SNP (Evans, October 2013; 
Evans, November 2009). To justify their ability to change policies in Wales, Leanne Wood 
claimed that Plaid Cymru could be a government that “protects Welsh pensioners from 
cuts in council tax benefit by doing a deal with local government - like the one reached in 
Scotland – rather than simply acting as the Tories’ henchmen” (Wood, September 2012). 
Capitalizing on Scottish connections indicates to the public that Plaid Cymru’s policies are 
legitimate and well tested, which is more important for them because they have never been 
in government. 
Forming transnational coalitions enables minority nationalist MEPs to draw attention 
to the issues they care about, to call attention to more successful parties, to increase staffing 
numbers which disseminates the benefits of European engagement throughout membership. 
 
Conclusion 
Given the failure of the Europe of the Regions and the Euroscepticism of the British 
political system, why have minority nationalist parties remained pro-European? Minority 
nationalists have remained pro-European because of the characteristics intrinsic to small and 
oppositional parties, namely: (1) the dominance and continuity of party leadership on EU 
policy, (2) the underdeveloped nature of EU policy, and (3) the importance of transnational 
coalitions. 
Before discussing these characteristics I reviewed previous approaches to the relation-
ship between minority nationalists and Europe. The more developed of these approaches 
is the top-down approach but this approach became outdated. The bottom-up literature 
provides an updated, party political angle. This literature’s contention that “strategic and 
tactical considerations exerted a growing pressure on what position was formally espoused 
vis-a-vis the EU” in minority nationalist parties was a foundational idea of this paper (Elias, 
2008, p. 577). 
The strategic considerations that have allowed minority nationalist parties to remain 
pro-European are those of small and oppositional parties. The small and oppositional mech-
anisms that maintain pro-Europeanism are a dominance of leadership in EU policymaking, a 
broadly oppositional EU policy, and transnational benefits. These characteristics encourage 
pro-European policy inertia by reducing incentives to develop detailed or new EU policy, 
providing strong oppositional uses of the EU and providing resource and reputational ben-
efits. Notably I showed the influence of minority nationalist leaders on their party’s EU 
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positions is not dependent on their nationalism but rather on small party structures that 
champion unilateral leadership and strategic oppositional positions to attack mainstream 
party competitors. 
Limitations of Argument and Implications for the Future
These findings are limited by a small case study and definitional difficulties. However, 
my argument should not be seen in isolation but rather as a complement to broader work. 
Limiting my case study enabled a deeper look within parties and allowed me to examine the 
way that parties act at all levels of governance without having to explain differences between 
countries. Using a solely UK study may hinder generalizability. However, it adds depth of 
knowledge and information in a field with a wealth of multi-country comparisons through 
the work of Anwen Elias (2008), Carolyn Rowe (2011), Janet Laible (2008), Jurgen-Klaus 
Nagel (2004) and Michael Keating (1995, 2005, 2008). 
In order to focus on party strategy, my definitions take nationalism and European in-
tegration as constant. This is ultimately not limiting because EU positions are shown to be a 
function of strategy not EU changes or nationalist ideology. Defining minority nationalists 
as small and oppositional could be questioned in light of growing Scottish and Catalonian 
parties. However, I would suggest that the rise of some minority nationalist parties is an op-
portunity to examine further implications. I will do so using the SNP as a case study. In light 
of my argument, the SNP’s growth should reduce pro-European policy.
Although my claim that they are small and oppositional remains true at the state level, 
in devolved government the SNP is no longer in opposition. The Scottish Government 
and Parliament have had an SNP majority since 2011. This majority enabled their efforts 
to take advantage of devolution by seeking more power within the European Union. They 
have tried to take some negotiating powers, which have been traditionally reserved to states. 
Their change in positioning seems to have had some effect on their pro-Europeanism but 
any significant policy change has been hindered by lack of real governing power and the 
availability of the UK Government as a rhetorical scapegoat. 
For example, the Scottish Government works with the European Commission on 
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), through the Cabinet Secretary for Rural Affairs and the 
Environment Richard Lochhead. This has changed their small and oppositional strategy in 
two ways. First, Lochhead relies on Scottish Government civil servants to provide informa-
tion on fisheries so informational responsibility is removed from the Euro-enthusiast experts 
within the party and in Brussels. As such, the SNP has developed a clear and detailed policy 
proposal on fisheries, which it does not do for each EU issue. Second, Lochhead has tried 
to insert himself into negotiations directly and has cooperated with both the EU and the 
UK Government for influence on fisheries (BBC News, October 2013). This means that 
his solutions have had to become more like those of a governing party. As a result, Loch-
head’s criticism of the EU on fisheries has taken on a more Eurosceptic tone. He has said, 
“Many of the problems we have with the current system is ill-fitting regulations imposed on 
Scotland by Brussels” (Whitelaw, 2011).
However, there has not been substantive change to the overall pro-Europeanism of 
the party because the SNP still acts small and oppositional on overall EU policy. There have 
been no changes within the SNP’s internal decision making since gaining a majority. As 
such, SNP fisheries policy is still centrally decided. Additionally, Lochhead’s efforts to bypass 
the UK Government were not entirely successful. For example, the timing of their consul-
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tation meant they did not have direct influence on decisions (Whitelaw, 2011). As a result 
of lack of access, the SNP policy on fisheries continues to be dealt with by MEPs and their 
staff which tempers the Eurosceptic language used by Lochhead. MEP Hudghton suggests 
that, “The management of Scotland’s fisheries over the past 40 years has been characterized 
by uncaring governments in London and an over-centralised approach in Brussels. This lat-
ter problem is being addressed to some extent” (Hudghton, 2014). Additionally, the SNP 
still aims their discontent with fisheries policy at mainstream parties, not the EU. SNP MP 
Angus Robertson argued to the UK Government, “You are right to describe the CFP as 
having been a disaster, but you should probably admit and acknowledge that it was a Con-
servative government that signed us into it in the first place” (Robertson, 2013). 
Although SNP fisheries policy has taken on a more Eurosceptic tone, one issue area 
is not enough to create nuance to the party’s pro-European policy. If minority nationalist 
parties were to grow further, the process by which the SNP has become strongly critical 
on CFP could be echoed in more policy areas. However, current growth is not enough. 
Only further devolution on the EU could shift minority nationalists from small and op-
positional strategy. My argument does imply that members of minority nationalist parties 
and EU scholars should not mistake the pro-Europeanism in minority nationalist parties for 
inherent Euro-enthusiasm. Size and positioning can change and when they do, they will 
change the way in which minority nationalist parties engage with the European Union and 
will create internal fissures on the matter. The most imminent possibility for a minority na-
tionalist party to overcome their small and oppositional status is the Scottish independence 
referendum in September 2014. This case stands as a test to show what will happen once 
the small and oppositional incentives for pro-Europeanism fade. By changing their size and 
positioning, independence in Scotland or more devolution of EU policy to Scotland might 
alter the trend of minority nationalist pro-Europeanism and finally rattle the SNP’s 35 year 
policy of “Independence in Europe.” 
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